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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW VOL. XIV
recovery by the named insured had been permitted.7 In that year,
the national standard policy was revised so that the named
insured was explicitly barred from bringing such a suit.8 How-
ever, in 1947 the standard policy was again revised,9 and the
clauses which had barred action by the named insured were
omitted. There is no indication in the text of the opinion that
this history was before the court when it reached its decision.
Although the insurer in this suit may have had no knowl-
edge of this history, he is required by Louisiana law to extend
the full coverage of the standard policy.' 0 Since these changes
indicate a definite intention that the standard policy permit
recovery by the named insured, the decision, though based exclu-
sively on the wording of the policy, is manifestly correct.
Robert J. Jones
LOUISIANA PRACTICE-EFFECT OF APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY
WRITS ON TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Defendant's exception of lis pendens was overruled by the
trial court. Defendant then notified the trial judge that she
intended to apply to the Supreme Court for a review of the
ruling under its supervisory jurisdiction. Subsequently, default
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant's
motion to vacate the judgment was denied and she made appli-
7. Farmer v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 11 F. Supp. 542
(M.D. Ala. 1935); Howe v. Howe, 87 N.H. 338, 179 Atl. 362 (1935); Archer v.
General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, 219 Wis. 100, 261 N.W. 9 (1935).
8. 1 INSURANCE POLICY ANNOTATIONS, SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW OF AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION 29 (Supp. 1945):
"(b) INJURY TO OR DEATH OF .... NAMED INSURED
"The insurance with respect to any person or organization other than the
named insured does not apply: (a) to Injury to or death of any person who
is a named insured."
APPLEMAN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE 106 (1938):
"DEFINITION OF INSURED
"The unqualified word 'Insured' wherever used . . . Includes not only
the named insured but also any person while using the automobile and
any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided
that the declared and actual use of the automobile Is 'pleasure and business'
or 'commercial,' each as defined herein, and provided further that the actual
use is with the permission of the named Insured. The provisions of this
paragraph do not apply:
"(b) to any person or organization with respect to bodily Injury to or
death of any person who is a named insured."
9. Note 6 supra.
10. LA. R.S. § 22:623 (1950).
NOTES
cation for supplemental writs of review. Held, formal notice of
intent to apply for supervisory writs stays proceedings in the trial
court'for such reasonable time as may be necessary for applica-
tion to be made. State ex rel. Marston v. Marston, 223 La. 1046,
67 So.2d 587 (1953).
In holding that mere notice of intent serves to suspend trial
court proceedings the court relied upon Rule XIII, Section 2, of
the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court' and upon the case of
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Alwes,2 in which this rule, accord-
ing to the instant decision, was properly interpreted. The court
distinguished the case of First National Bank Bldg. Co. v. Dickson
& Denny8 on the ground that the pertinent provision of the
Supreme Court Rules was not considered in that case.
In Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Alwes there was no conten-
tion made by either litigant that trial court proceedings had been
stayed by notice of intent to apply for supervisory writs. The
question was whether the giving of this notice rectified non-
compliance with Section 7 of Rule XIII requiring that the peti-
tion for writs be mailed or delivered to the trial judge and
adverse party. In holding that giving notice does not relieve a
party from serving copies of the petition, the court stated that
the notice given was effective only to stay proceedings in the
trial court. This statement, made incidentally by the court in
deciding another question, was relied on in the instant case as
a proper interpretation of the rule.
In the First National Bank Bldg. case, after dismissal of
defendant's reconventional demand, the trial judge was notified
that application would be made to the Supreme Court for review
of the dismissal decree. The trial judge was requested to suspend
proceedings pending action on the application but refused to
do so. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal, stating
in definite terms that mere notice to the trial judge of intention
to apply for supervisory writs does not serve to stay proceedings.
Proceedings are suspended only if the writs are granted together
with a stay order which is served on the judge.
1. "The party or attorney intending to apply to this court for a writ of
certiorari or review, or for any remedial writ, shall give to the judge whose
ruling is complained of, and to the party made respondent, or parties made
respondents, such notice as may be deemed necessary to stay further pro-
ceedings pending the application to the Supreme Court; provided, however,
that a failure to give such notice shall not be, of itself, sufficient cause for
dismissing the application or recalling or rescinding the writ or rule nisi."
219 La. lxxxv (1951) (effective Jan. 1, 1952).
2. 204 La. 637, 16 So.2d 217 (1943).
3. 202 La. 970, 13 So.2d 283 (1943).
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Thus, precisely the same question was treated in both the
Marston and First National Bank Bldg. cases with irreconcilable
results.4 It is interesting to note that in the first sentence of the
opinion in the Marston case Justice Ponder states that when writs
were granted for the purpose of reviewing the trial judge's ruling
rejecting the plea of lis pendens a stay order was also issued.
If, as the opinion later holds, notice of intent serves to stay the
proceedings, why did the court consider it necessary to issue the
stay order?
Although not mentioned in the instant case, support for the
position taken in the First, National Bank Bldg. case is found in
Arthur v. Dupuy.5 That controversy arose as a result of a previ-
ous suit in which an injunction had been sought to prevent the
plaintiff in the Arthur case from executing a contract. The trial
judge had granted leave to dissolve the injunction on bond and
the plaintiff in injunction moved for suspensive appeal from
that order. The motion was denied and notice was given that
application for remedial writs would be made. Subsequently,
the injunction was dissolved. On petition of the plaintiff in
injunction a record of the proceedings was ordered to be sent up
for review by the Supreme Court. The suit was terminated by
a decree rescinding the restraining order and dismissing the
application for writs. Thereafter, plaintiff claimed that he had
been restrained for a period of time after the date on which the
injunction was dissolved by the trial judge. Although not explic-
itly mentioned in the opinion, this contention was apparently
based on the theory that the trial judge's action in accepting and
approving the bond dissolving the injunction was invalid because
done after notification of intent to apply for supervisory writs.
It was held, however, that the dissolution had been effective. No
restraining order had been issued by the Supreme Court, and
the mere ordering tip of a copy of the proceedings could not be
construed as a stay order. Thus, the court in the Arthur case was
of the opinion that no stay of proceedings resulted from the
service of notice of intent to apply for remedial writs.
The Marston and First National Bank Bldg. cases represent
two possible answers to the question of whether trial court pro-
ceedings should be stayed when a litigant gives notice of his
4. The language of Rule XIII, § 2, of the Revised Rules of the Supreme
Court, considered in the Marston case, is identical with that of the corre-
sponding provision of the Supreme Court Rules considered in the First
National Bank Bldg. case.
5. 130 La. 782, 58 So. 570 (1912).
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intention to seek review under the supervisory jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. Together with a third alternative, these
possible solutions may be stated as follows:
(1) Notification of intent serves to stay proceedings for
such time as may be reasonably necessary to allow
application to be made.
(2) Notification of intent does not stay proceedings. Only
issuance and service of writs or a stay order on the
trial judge can have that effect.
(3) After notification the trial judge may proceed; however,
he must assume the risk that actions taken after noti-
fication will be nullified if the writs are issued.
It is submitted that mere notification of intent should not
serve to stay proceedings. Only the service of the writs or a stay
order on the trial judge should have that effect. If, in compliance
with the third alternative, the trial judge were allowed to pro-
ceed at his risk, there would always be as a possible consequence
the needless waste of time and effort if proceedings subsequent
to notification were nullified. On the other hand, the result of
the instant case will be to allow a litigant to stay trial court
proceedings merely by giving notice of his intention to apply to
the Supreme Court for review of a ruling by the trial judge.
Clearly, the trial of a case under such circumstances would
become an impossible task if an attorney not averse to the use
of dilatory tactics were allowed to suspend proceedings in this
manner. Although a literal interpretation of the Supreme Court
rule in question supports the position taken in the instant case,
it is believed that this interpretation will prove unworkable
and that reinstatement of the rule of the First National Bank
Bldg. case offers the soundest solution of the problem.
Neilson Jacobs
MINERAL RIGHTS-OBLIGATIONS-POTESTATIVE CONDITION-
DAMAGES FOR FAILURE TO DRILL
Plaintiffs, lessors, sought damages from defendant, lessee, for
an alleged breach of contract to drill. The lease provided: "Lessee
agrees to commence the drilling of a well in search of oil, gas or
other minerals, on the leased premises, on or before one hundred
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